I. Introduction
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was organized in 1905 to control game violence in college football.
After World War II, the NCAA's activities expanded into economic regulation, including the control of athletic scholarships and the sale of television broadcast rights for college football games. 
II. The NCAA Enters College Football Television Broadcasting
The first live college football game was broadcast in 1938, albeit to only six viewers.
2 As the number of households with television receivers expanded in the late 1940s, individual universities increasingly arranged to televise their games. In the aftermath of this report, the NCAA's television committee concluded that televising college football games into areas where other games were played was detrimental to live attendance and gate receipts, and recommended a moratorium on live broadcasts.
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At its 1951 convention, the NCAA revoked its then existing policy allowing each individual institution complete control over the marketing of its athletic events, a first step toward prohibiting broadcasts into areas where another Association member was hosting a game.
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Id. at 93. The NCAA signed its first Association-wide college football television contract with a broadcast network in 1952. The one year contract called for NBC to pay the NCAA $1.14 million, in return for which NBC could select a game to broadcast on Saturday afternoons with assurance that no other NCAA college football broadcast would appear on a competitive network. 8 Exclusivity was the key to the agreement. As would be expected from a revenue maximizing monopolist, the NCAA restricted the games for sale--to only one per week--thus adding scarcity value to the broadcast rights.
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Id., at 2954, and Sperber, Murray. College Sports, Inc. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990): 49. 7 Id. at 49. In order to broaden support among the NCAA's members for the centralized sale of the rights, the contracts limited the number of times an individual institution could be selected for the game of the week, thereby expanding the number of different teams appearing.
Beyond appearance limitations, the selection of games to be broadcast was left to the networks in order to maximize the value of the contract to the winning bidder.
The result was a concentration of appearances among a limited number of "big-time"
football programs. Many teams never appeared on the game of the week. The distribution of the rights revenues created tension among member institutions from the beginning, but more complaints arose from the teams that appeared frequently than came from those that seldom or never appeared. The teams whose games were selected frequently were the ones constrained by the maximum appearance limitations.
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Id. at 96.
They argued that they were the attraction of the contract and should receive an even larger proportion of the revenues than was allocated to them.
10
Over time, appearance limitations were relaxed to appease the institutions with big-time football programs, but not relaxed sufficiently to placate the institutions with popular teams.
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The numerous smaller and less popular programs coalesced to maintain the appearance limitations in the democratic NCAA. They understood that uncapping appearances would divert almost all of the rights fees to a few popular programs with a large following.
III. Formation of the College Football Association
In 1977 sixty-two of the largest college football programs formed the College Football Association (CFA). 12 All CFA members were also members of the NCAA. The initial purpose of the CFA was to coordinate internal NCAA lobbying efforts on behalf of major college football interests.
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Id. at 96-97. The CFA hoped to increase the demand for college football and to insure that the most popular programs received a larger share of the revenues. It developed an academic eligibility standard that was later adopted as the NCAA's Proposition 48 concerning playing eligibility of freshmen athletes and it produced annual graduation rate surveys.
14 Although the CFA enjoyed some small victories in terms of a modest relaxation in appearance limitations, the NCAA's democratic voting rules frustrated the group's efforts to divert more of the exploding football broadcast revenues to the major programs. In an effort to take advantage of this opening, the NCAA argued that the collective sale of television broadcast rights helped to protect live attendance at games and was necessary to maintain competitive balance among teams. The participation fee was equal for each university that joined the package. It compensated teams for the "right of first refusal" for their games, and constituted 25 percent of the first two contracts (1984, and 1985-86) . It fell to 20 percent of the final two contracts.
IV. CFA Litigation Against the NCAA
The participation fee gave each CFA institution about $50,000
in 1984, about twice that each year from 1985 through 1990, and around $150,000 annually from 1991 through 1995.
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Id.
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Id. at 164.
In return each university agreed to put its games into the CFA inventory and not to broadcast them on Saturday afternoon in competition with the contract game-of-the-week if they were not selected.
27
A significant participation fee was necessary to hold the agreement together because, unlike the NCAA, the CFA possessed no power to punish defectors with expulsion from other sports tournaments.
The appearance fee component of revenue distribution was an amount paid to an institution when its team was selected for In 1991 the CFA returned its television package to ABC and ESPN (both then owned by Capital Cities Broadcasting). Remarkably, the Big Ten/Pac Ten contract was also won by ABC in 1991. Once ABC controlled both contracts, it could broadcast a single game on Saturday afternoon in a particular location, reverting to the "good old days" before 1984. Although ABC eliminated direct competition in selling advertising time on football games on Saturday afternoon by capturing both coalition's contracts, it did have to bid aggressively to win both contracts. The dual contracts presented ABC with a new problem--how to meet its obligations to broadcast all of the games it had promised to air. The network proposed to do this by airing mostly regional telecasts, capitalizing on the fact that few college football teams have a truly national following.
The regional broadcast format generated concern among CFA members, but the lucrative financial aspects of the offer eventually induced CFA members to sign with ABC. This decision had significant repercussions for the CFA. Notre Dame, the one prominent CFA university located in the middle of Big Ten territory, has a national following. Notre Dame was unhappy with ABC's regional broadcast format and, consequently, resigned from the CFA's football broadcast package in order to sign an independent four-year $38 million deal with NBC, more than doubling its annual television revenues from football broadcasts. As a result, the CFA lost the most popular independent team from its game inventory. The CFA was able to maintain broadcasting rights fees substantially above marginal cost despite its direct competition with the Big Ten/Pac Ten coalition for the Saturday afternoon game of the week. This implies that actual competition was less than a simple enumeration of the broadcast contracts might suggest.
Everyone would like to join a successful cartel and share the economic rents. The CFA was no exception. Several universities petitioned for membership, but only a few were admitted during the CFA's twelve year reign as a football broadcasting coordinator. A profit-maximizing cartel will admit only those rivals who produce sufficiently close substitutes so that were they excluded, enough customers would switch to the rival to reduce the cartel's profits by more than a new member's share of profits. 32 This reasoning can be used to infer the extent of the market from cartel membership.
The CFA established entry requirements. Applicants had to be members of NCAA Division 1, "highly committed" to a major college football program, average at least 17,000 paid spectators per game, and play in a stadium with a minimum seating capacity of 30,000.
Beyond those requirements, a new applicant had to be approved by the existing membership, which looked toward additional criteria such as strength of schedule and expenditures on the football program as signs of "commitment." The most obvious new members were Big Ten and Pac Ten conference teams. The fact that little effort was devoted to assimilating the two groups implies either that regional parochialism on the part of television viewers provided each coalition with sufficient market power in its own geographic area, or that one or both of the coalitions believed that the independence of the other was necessary to avoid a situation analogous to the illegal NCAA arrangement that they replaced.
VII. The Market Structure for College Football Television Broadcast Rights
Number of sellers. There was very little overlap among the geographic territories of the two coalitions selling major college football game broadcasts after June 1984. Inelastic demand. The payoff to cartel orchestration is greater where barriers to entry are high and demand is inelastic.
In such circumstances customers exploited by elevated prices have few choices--either in terms of other suppliers of the same product or in terms of substitute products. Price increases in markets with inelastic demand are destined to elevate profits because revenues must (at least initially) rise while costs fall with lower output.
The demand for broadcast rights is a derived demand, arising from the demand by advertisers for time to tout their products during game telecasts. Television networks are thus intermediaries. They buy broadcast rights from universities that try to get the highest possible price, sell advertising time to firms that desire to communicate with a target audience--primarily young males--and are largely indifferent as to how they reach that audience. The fewer alternatives available to reach the target audience, the more inelastic is demand, and the higher will be the price of advertising time.
The demand for advertising on Saturday afternoon college football games is inelastic because the alternatives are abysmal.
The prime-time hits, Seinfeld and Friends, were not shown on Saturday afternoons. Reruns of Lassie and Leave it to Beaver, or World War II documentaries are the best alternatives to Saturday afternoon football, and young men do not flock to these classics.
At an advertising price reflecting marginal cost for a college football broadcast, advertisers can reach so many target consumers per dollar that their demand is quite inelastic. But in the absence of good substitute programming, the networks push prices above the competitive level, at least to the point that advertisers begin to consider alternatives, thereby providing the networks with rents that, in turn, boost their demand for broadcast rights. because the key ingredients for success were present: low organization costs, large potential benefits in the form of inelastic demand for broadcast rights at competitive prices, substantial impediments to the erosion of revenues by entry, regional market power caused by parochial fan interests, the ability to detect cheating on the agreement and punish defectors, and a distribution of proceeds that initially was perceived to be fairer than the NCAA arrangement it replaced.
There was no question that cheating would be detected. After all, how can a football game be broadcast secretly? And cheating could be punished. Even at the high discount rates appropriate to the early 1980s, the expected net present value of a flow of annual $50,000 participation fees exceeded the most optimistic single game rights fee a defector could expect before retaliatory competition would cause fees to plummet. With few attractive programming alternatives available for weekend afternoons, each network was able to base the price of advertising time as much on its value to the advertisers as on cost.
Fox, however, then destabilized broadcasting relationships by outbidding CBS for the NFL's National Conference broadcast rights in December 1995.
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CBS was left with no football programming, a substantial gap in its advertising menu, and a lot of dissatisfied affiliates just while Fox was recruiting stations. 34 To get back into football broadcasting, CBS offered the SEC the deal it finally couldn't (and didn't) refuse. There was little the remaining CFA members could do to counter the CBS offer to the SEC. By 1995 most of the former vulnerable independents had joined conferences. With a conference organization to fall back on, the once conciliatory independents were unlikely to yield further revenue shares to the SEC. Negotiating room had evaporated.
Over time the conditions that once facilitated the CFA agreement had faded--the inexperience of individual conferences in negotiating their own television deals and the willingness of some (mostly former independent) CFA members to placate the more aggressive programs with revenue concessions were largely history.
Moreover, the benefits to the SEC of defecting rose when the conference expanded its membership in 1991, and again when Fox left CBS desperate for football programming. programming. This combination squeezed the once flush margins enjoyed by the sports broadcasting oligopoly. As broadcast rights fees increased, the SEC's opportunity cost of remaining loyal to the CFA eventually became intolerable, and the conference defected.
After the CFA lost its authority to contract with television networks on behalf of its members it temporarily returned to its role as an advocacy group in the NCAA. Turner, Todd. Personal Interview (April 27, 1998) .
